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Boeckman: Boeckman: Effects of Recent Developments

The Effects of Recent Developments
on the TELCO/CATV Cross-Ownership
Prohibitions'
On October24,1991, the FederalCommunicationsCommissionproposed
rules allowing the telephone companies to offer a "video dial tone" over
telephone lines that would carry programmingproduced by outside companies.2 Although not allowed to produce the programs, the telephone
companies would be permitted to package and transmit television programming. The proposed rules do require that telephone companies make their
networks available to all programmers.' The Federal Communications
Commission also opened an inquiry on whether to let the telephone companies
produceprograms."
I. INTRODUCTION

William L. Weiss, chairperson and chief executive officer of
American Information Technologies, states "most people [in the United
States], and most of our leaders, do not understand the linkage" between the
"quality of the public communications network, national prosperity, and global
competitiveness." 5 In the United States, "[we] still don't seem to recognize
the connection between our information capabilities and our economic future.
Telecommunications belongs near the very summit of our national priorities."6
As telecommunications enters its most innovative and costly phase, a core
issue in the evolving telecommunications debate is whether we should repeal
cross-ownership laws and regulations. 7 These laws and regulations prohibit

1. This article was presented to the Communication Technology and Policy
Division at the 1991 Annual Convention of the Association for Education in
Journalism and Mass Communication.
2. Andrews, Phone Companies Could Transmit TV Under F.C.C. Plan, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 25, 1991, at Al. The proposed rules were unanimously adopted in a 5 to
0 vote and "are likely to be adopted by the [Federal Communications Commission]
within a year." Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at Al & D16.
5. TelecommunicationsExecutiveCompares U.S. andForeignPriorities,123 No.
2 PUBLIc UTIL FORTNIGHTLY 17 (Jan. 19, 1989).

6. id.
7. See The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2,
98 Stat. 2779, 2785 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (Supp. 1989)); 47 C.F.R.

§§ 63.54-.58 (1988).
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telephone companies (telcos) from owning cable television (CATV) systems
within their telephone service areas. Before analyzing the current crossownership prohibitions and the future shape such restrictions might take, it is
necessary to provide an overview of how a cable system works and a
summary of the cross-ownership laws and regulations.
A cable television operator transmits signals to customers via coaxial
cable. The cable operator collects the signals from the airwaves with an

antenna or microwave receiver, amplifies and converts them using a "headend"
device, and then sends the signals along a branching series of distribution
cables until they ultimately reach the homes of individual subscribers." To
secure the access to the utility poles and conduit space necessary for the
coaxial cable distribution system, the CATV industry enters leasing arrangements with telephone companies (the owners of the poles and conduits), rather
than constructing its own poles or conduits. 9 Because telephone companies
have a natural monopoly over this crucial link in the cable distribution system,
cable television operators have been dependent on the telephone companies.
Fearing that telcos owning or affiliating with cable companies used their
monopoly over utility poles and conduit space to prevent or hinder competition with independent cable operators, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted the telephone company/cable television cross-ownership
restrictions. 10 The rules prohibit telcos from offering CATV services in their
local service areas," and from owning any affiliate, subsidiary, or related
entity that provides cable television services. 2 The only telco/CATV
13
affiliation allowed by the broad prohibition is the carrier-user relationship.
The restrictions also bar telcos from providing pole or conduit space to
affiliated or controlled CATV systems within their telephone service areas.i4
Attempting to ensure that cable television is widely available to the
public, the FCC fashioned exceptions to the cross-ownership restrictions. If
CATV service cannot exist except through common ownership, or good cause

8. General Tel. Co. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
888 (1969).
9. Comment, Equal Access to Pole Attachment Agreements: Implications of
Telephone Company Participationin the Cable Television Market, 18 BALT. L. REV.

165, 167-69 (1988).
10. 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54-.58 (1988).
11. Former Bell Operating Companies are banned from providing cable television
outside their service areas. See infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
12. 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(a) (1988).
13. See id. § 63.54 n.1.
14. Id. § 63.54(b). By contrast, telephone companies must offer independent
CATV systems the alternative of pole attachment rights before providing channel
distribution services. Id. § 63.57.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/5
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is demonstrated, the cross-ownership rules are waived if such a waiver is in
the public interest.'5 In 1981 the FCC created an exemption for rural areas,
provided there already was not an independent cable system under construction or in existence. 6
Perceived as a necessary evil when created, the cross-ownership
restrictions are now considered by many as simply an evil. The prohibitions
have come under fire in several forums. The FCC recommended lifting the
ban. The judiciary has become involved through both Judge Harold Greene's
review of the Modified Final Judgment in the American Telephone and
Telegraph (AT&T) antitrust action, and Northwestern Indiana Telephone
Company, Inc. v. FCC,7 in which an Indiana telco unlawfully affiliated with

a CATV company. Several bills dealing with telco entry into cable or
reregulating the CATV industry are receiving serious consideration by
Congress.
In each forum the telephone companies are in one corner and the cable
television operators are in the opposite corner. Claiming to be wearing the
white trunks, the telcos argue that the cable industry no longer needs
protection, and paint black trunks on the CATV companies.1 8 The cable
industry is, according to the telcos, an unregulated monopoly that has

19
excessive control over programming and unreasonable consumer leverage.

A competitive cable market can lower cable rates and increase diversity in
programming and program choices. 2 The telcos further claim that "[o]pening up the cable industry to competition would expedite the deployment of
new technologies."2 Telcos currently feel limited to narrowband distribution
systems, or at most, a very slow conversion to broadband networks. The
telephone industry argues that with CATV, it can more rapidly upgrade to
broadband distribution systems.22 A broadband network is essential to the
development of a fiber-optic system, which promises such services as high-

15. Id. §§ 64.56(a), (6). See also In re Revision of the Processing Policies for
Waivers of the Telephone Company-Cable Television "Cross-Ownership Rules," 69
F.C.C. 2d 1097, 1110-11 (1978) (clarification of what constitutes "good cause" under
§ 64.56(a)).
16. 47 C.F.R. § 63.58 (1988). See also Report and Order, CC Docket No. 80767, 88 F.C.C. 2d 564 (1981).

17. 872 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990).
18. Sodolski, Elimination of the Cross-OwnershipRestrictions Would Serve the
Public Interest and Benefit Consumers, COMM. LAW., at 21-23 (Spring 1989). John

Sodolski is President of the United States Telephone Association. Id. at 22.
19. Id. at 21.
20. Id. at 22.
21. Id. at 21.
22. Id. at 22.
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definition television (HDTV), two-way video, and information retrieval.'
At stake, the telcos believe, is "the24 reliability and ubiquity of the nation's
telecommunications infrastructure."
Since broadband networks and fiber optics technology are already
available, the cable operators question the legitimacy of the need for telco
involvement in video programming. The CATV industry contends that
broadband systems have not been deployed because there is a lack of
consumer demand, not because telcos are forbidden from owning CATV
systems.25 According to the cable industry, the telcos want to participate in
the video programming business to justify fee increases. Without new capital
expenditures, the telephone companies will be forced to reduce their fees as
many of their assets have depreciated significantly. 26 The cable operators
argue that the telcos will use revenues from telephone services to underwrite
their ventures into CATV.27 This contention is strengthened by the staggering cost of the technology the telcos want to use to distribute video programming-one estimate places the cost of fiber optics at $500 billion.'
Citing the telephone companies' long history of anticompetitive behavior,
cable television operators believe telcos want to force them out of business.
The cable operators are the principal potential competition to the current telco

monopoly in interactive services."

Ringing the first amendment liberty bell,

the CATV industry contends that telco entry threatens the principle that
speech should be free from government intervention: "The temptation for a
heavily regulated industry whose profits are set by government to acceed30 [sic]
to government oversight of the editorial process would be frightening."
Because of the players' financial stake and the public's interest in cable
television, decisions affecting the cross-ownership restrictions probably will
be made in one or more forums. This Comment analyzes the cable television
market and the effects of telco entry on the CATV industry. It attempts to aid
the various forums in considering the effectiveness and necessity of the laws
on this crucial issue. First, however, it is important to understand the origins

23. Barret, The Potentialof Fiber Optics to the Home: A Regulator's Perspective, 123 No. 2 PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY 14 (Jan. 19, 1989).
24. Sodolski, supra note 18, at 21.
25. Mooney, Cross-OwnershipRestrictions-The Cable View, COMM. LAW., at
20 (Spring 1989). Mooney is President and CEO of the National Cable Television
Association. Id. at 21.
26. Id. at 20.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Lloyd, Telephone Company Entry Into Video Programming (1989)

(WESTLAW, PLI Order No. G4-3826/1).
30. Mooney, supra note 25, at 21.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/5
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of the cross-ownership prohibitions, current developments in the forums
hearing the arguments, and the status of the cable and telecommunications
markets.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: To REGULATE OR NOT TO REGULATE
The regulation of telephone company involvement in the cable television
industry reflects the efforts of the federal government to strike a balance.
Such a balance should effectively serve the interests of the cable and
telephone companies, television audiences, and the nation's telecommunications policies.
CATV systems emerged around 1950,3' and the FCC did not initially
regulate the industry. But in the mid-1960s, after broadcasters recognized
cable television as a competitor, the FCC began considering regulation.32 In
1970, following a two-year inquiry, the FCC found an "anomalous competitive
situation" between CATV systems owned by, or affiliated with telcos, and
independent cable television systems relying upon the telcos for channel
service offerings or access to pole attachments.33 This "anomalous situation"
developed from the telephone companies' natural monopoly over the utility
pole lines required for cable television distribution.3 The FCC concluded

31.

The [cable television] industry began in 1948 when
appliance store owners, anxious to demonstrate television but
unable to do so because of weak signals, erected large antennas
connected to an amplification and distribution system. Early
cable systems grew in communities with weak broadcast
reception, either because of natural conditions (such as shading
by mountains) or because the communities were at the fringes of
the service areas of early TV broadcasters. They became known
as Community Antenna Television Systems (CATVs) ....

GILLMOR, BARRON, SIMON & TERRY, MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAw 874 (5th ed.
1990) [hereinafter MAsS COMMUNICATIONS LAw].
32. Because the primary purpose of early CATV systems was improving a
community's reception of available, but hard to receive, over-the-air television
programs, additional broadcasting audiences were available, and ergo the broadcasters
liked the new systems. When CATV began offering competing services, however, the
broadcasters became concerned and "manipulated the policymaking system into several
years of regulatory suppression of cable television growth." Id. at 875.
33. In re Application of Telcos for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities
Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, 21 F.C.C. 2d 307,
323, reconsid in part, 22 F.C.C. 2d 746 (1970), affd sub nom. General Tel. Co. v.
United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).

34. Id. at 324. The FCC determined that telcos could use their control of pole
and conduit space not only to exclude others from the cable television market, but to
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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that the public interest dictated prohibiting telcos from engaging in the sale of
CATV services within their telephone service areas.3"
When the cross-ownership rules were adopted, cable television was in its
infancy and was available to only nine percent of the nation's households.3 6
According to recent accounts in the trade press, cable service is available to
about ninety percent of the country. Cable industry revenue was $17.7 billion
in 1989-more than double the $8.5 billion in revenue in 1984.37
Despite the growth and apparent stability of the cable market since the
1971 passage of the cross-ownership prohibition, Congress codified the crossownership rules in section 613(b) of the Cable Communications Act of
1984 ! 8 Apart from instructing the FCC to permit telco ownership of cable
systems in rural areas,39 Congress did not independently develop conclusions
about the prohibition. 40 The regulations adopted by the FCC to implement

Section 613(b) were essentially the same as the FCC's pre-existing cable
41
television/telephone company cross-ownership rules.

extend their monopoly to new broadband services that might otherwise be provided
over coaxial facilities by independent operators. Id.
35. Id. at 325-26. The Commission amended part 63 of its rules to include the
telco/cable television cross-ownership rules. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54-.58 (1988). The
FCC's decision to adopt the cross-ownership regulations was upheld by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir.
1971).
36. Telephone Company/Cable Television Cross-Ownership Restrictions (Notice
of Inquiry), CC Docket No. 87-266,2 F.C.C. Rec. 5092,5093 (Aug. 1987) [hereinafter
1987 Original Notice of Inquiry].
37. In re Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission's Policies Relating
to the Provision of Cable Television Service (Report), MM Docket No. 89-600, 5
F.C.C. Rec. 4962, 4966-67 (July 31, 1990).
38. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98
Stat. 2779, 2785 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (Supp. 1989)).
39. Congress intended to permit telco ownership of cable systems in rural areas,
regardless of whether service from an independent provider was available. The
Commission's previous policy was to limit telephone company ownership of cable
systems to those areas where there was no independent cable ownership. See H.R.
Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 56-57 (1984); see also 47 C.F.R. § 63.58
(1988).
40. The legislative history of the Cable Act indicates that it was "the intent of
Section 613(b) to codify current FCC rules concerning the provision of video
programming over cable systems by common carriers." H.R. Rep. No. 934, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 56 (1984).
41. See Amendment of Parts 1, 63, and 76 of the Commission's Rules to
Implement the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Report
and Order, MM Docket No. 841296, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637 (1985).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/5
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Although Congress gave the cable television industry a vote of confidence in 1984, the FCC in 1987 began an inquiry to determine whether the
restrictions on telco entry actually did encourage competitive provision of
cable services.42 After examining the comments submitted by fifty-five
parties, the FCC in 1988 reached the tentative conclusion that "greater
participation in the provision of cable television service by telephone common
carriers would result in greater, not lesser, competition in cable television
3
'4

service. s

The FCC based its decision on two findings. First, the FCC determined
that the cable industry was no longer a fledgling in need of protection.'
According to the FCC, there was no risk of telco preemption of broadband
cable services because the existing cable systems were already in operation. 45
The FCC noted that CATV operators had such favorable profitability, access
to programming, and investor interest that they had joined the "major leagues"

of American corporations.

The cable television industry was capable of

holding its own against competition from the telcos.4 ' Finally, the FCC
observed, any remaining concerns that telcos might compete unfairly with
independent cable operators could be satisfied by means less restrictive than
a blanket ban.47

Second, the FCC found that the cross-ownership prohibitions were not
producing the competition and new services they were intended to produce.4
Instead, cable had become a largely unregulated monopoly-within a

42. 1987 Original Notice of Inquiry, supra note 36, at 5092.
43. In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules (Further
Notice of Inquiry), CC Docket No. 87-266, 3 F.C.C. Rec. 5849, 5849 (1988)
[hereinafter 1988 Further Notice of Inquiry].
The FCC also addressed in the 1988 Further Notice of Inquiry whether the crossownership prohibitions violated the first amendment. Acknowledging that the
prohibition might implicate first amendment rights, the FCC found the prohibition to
be "content neutral," and thus can continue to operate while the Commission-and
ultimately the Congress-consider eliminating the bar. Id. at 5864.
44. Id. at 5853.
45. Id.
46. Id. According to one commentator, telcos might possess an inherent
advantage over cable operators with respect to recently developed broadband services
(such as data distribution and facsimile transmission). "[B]ecause telephone companies
have existing plants and facilities which could be adapted in a relatively short time to
provide these services, they have the ability to enter the broadband market very
rapidly. Consequently, they would secure the market efficiencies that come with being
the first provider in an area."
Comment, supra note 9, at 187 n.153.
47. 1988 Further Notice of Inquiry, supra note 43, at 5854.
48. Id. at 5857.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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particular geographic area, the provision of cable service was usually
controlled by a single company. 49 Rates charged by these unregulated cable
monopolies had risen rapidly in recent years.:5 Furthermore, according to the
FCC, the cable industry generally had failed to develop any new services."
In addition, ownership of cable systems had become dramatically more
concentrated, 52 while simultaneously becoming increasingly vertically
integrated.5
The FCC recommended a scheme of nonstructura 54 and structural 5s
safeguards. These safeguards would allow telco entry into the cable market,
but prevent anti-competitive behavior by the telcos. The FCC provided few
details about such safeguards, and no regulations were drafted removing the
cross-ownership ban.
Several FCC proposals advocated relaxing the prohibition. The FCC
suggested that the "good cause" waiver be expanded to include telco proposals
for integrated broadband systems.5' The FCC also issued a Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, sanctioning increased affiliation between a telco and
cable system.57

49. Id. at 5852.
50. According to the General Accounting Office, the average monthly price of
basic cable rose twenty-nine percent between December 1,1986 and October 31, 1988.
See General Accounting Office, Telecommunications: National Survey of Cable
Television Rates and Services, REPORT TO THE CHAIRPERSON, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE, COMMITrEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,

HousE

OF REPRESENTAnVEs

(Aug. 3, 1989).

51. 1988 Further Notice of Inquiry, supra note 43, at 5853.
52. Id. at 5851-52. According to the telephone companies, the top four cable
operators serve thirty-five percent of cable subscribers. Id. at 5851.
53. Id. at 5852.
54. The non-structural safeguards "would allow telephone companies to provide
both regulated and unregulated services through one corporate unit, with certain
ownership, accounting, and regulatory restrictions imposed to protect consumers and
competitors from anti-competitive behavior." Note, Law and Public Policy On A
ConstitutionalCollision Course: A RegulatoryAlternative To The FCC's Telco-Cable
Cross-OwnershipProposal,40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1309, 1323 (1989). See also 1988
Further Notice of Inquiry, supra note 43, at 5859-60.
55. The structural safeguards require major carriers to provide unregulated
services "only through corporate affiliates fully separated from their basic regulated
services operations." 1988 Further Notice Of Inquiry, supra note 43, at 5858.
56. Id. at 5860-61.
57. Id. at 5865-66.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/5
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III. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS AND CONFLICTS
A. Non-CongressionalArenas
The FCC's 1988 recommendation of telco entry into cable television has
been the most unilateral act to date supporting the telephone companies.
Support since 1988 from the FCC and the federal judiciary for crossownership has been subtle. Such faint backing indicates that both .the FCC
and judiciary are content to let Congress wrestle with the cross-ownership
issue.
1. The FCC
There has been no formal action by the FCC concerning the crossownership restrictions since 1988.58 This three-year lull fosters the conclusion that the FCC is deferring to Congress on the cross-ownership issue.
The latest FCC development59 relevant to cross-ownership was a July
1990 report recommending competition, not rate regulation, as the means for
achieving a healthier cable television industry.' The FCC concluded that
numerous sources are emerging which are capable of providing competition
to the cable television operators. 6' Because competition is materializing in
cable television, the Commission discouraged any long-term regulation of
cable television rates and services. The FCC expressly declined in the report
to speculate on the competitive potential of telcos in cable televisionA2 The
FCC noted that deciding the fate of telco involvement in CATV is a separate
issue.63 The July 1990 report contained mixed signals for the telcos. FCC
58. Two months after the release of the FCC proposals, the Commission's Office
of Plans and Policy (OPP) issued a report critical and contradictory of it: own
Commission's findings. See Pepper, Through the Looking Glass: Integrated
BroadbandNetworks, Regulatory Policy andInstitutionalChange, 24 OPP WORKING
PAPER 103-06 (Nov. 1988).
59. The FCC recently published Reexamination of the Effective Competition
Standardfor the Regulation of Cable Television Basic Service Rates, FurtherNotice
of ProposedRule Making, 6 F.C.C. Rec. 208, 208 (Dec. 31, 1990) [hereinafter The
Effective Competition Standard].
60. Competition, Rate Deregulationand the Commission's PoliciesRelating to
the Provisionof Cable Television Service, 5 F.C.C. Rec. 4962, 4962 (July 26, 1990)
[hereinafter Competition and Rate DeregulationReport].
61. Id. at 5020. Potential sources offering competition to CATV include second
cable systems, wireless cable systems, home satellite dishes, direct broadcast satellite
services, and satellite master antenna television systems. Id.
62. Id. at 5019.
63. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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support for competition indicates that the door is still open for telco entry into
CATV; an FCC recommendation of regulation might have foreclosed telco
entry. The FCC's finding that other sources offer competition to cable
systems, however, decreases the need for telco involvement in cable television.
If other multichannel providers can eliminate the monopoly in the cable
industry, the FCC may decide there is no need to endure the risks posed by
telco-cable.
FCC Chairman Alfred Sikes, in his statement accompanying the report,
supported the pro-competition policy.64 Sikes' statement ignored the
telephone companies as a potential cable television competitor. 65 But other
comments by Commissioner Sikes reveal that he considers telcos a feasible
and desirable competitor to CATV systems.6 Thus, high level FCC support
for telco entry still appears to exist. The timing and tone of the FCC's report
indicate that it hoped the release would tilt congressional opinion toward
competition. Telco involvement in cable television is a sensitive issue, and
the FCC may be currently ignoring the telcos to avoid destroying congressional support for competition.
Although the FCC appears to favor deference to Congress, the Commission is increasingly frustrated by Congress' inaction. According to Chairman
Sikes, "we deferred action on [cross-ownership] last fall, stating that Congress
seemed to be on the threshold of enacting a cable television bill ....,67
Sikes expected Commission action by the spring of 1991 if Congress'
stalemate continued.'
However, no such action was taken by the FCC.
This inaction compels the conclusion that Chairman Sikes was merely trying
to "motivate" Congress.
Although the FCC appears to be awaiting congressional action, it is using
its discretion in administering the cross-ownership exceptions to allow

increased telco ownership of cable systems. The FCC can approve operation
of a cable system by a telephone company in the telco's service area if "good
cause" exists or the CATV service can only exist through common ownership.69 In 1988 the FCC granted a waiver allowing the General Telephone
Company (GTE) to build and partly operate a cable television system in
Cerritos, California. 70 Although a subsidiary (Apollo Cablevision) operated

64. Sikes, Statement of FCC Chairman Alfred C. Sikes on the Commission's
Cable Television Report, 5 F.C.C. Rec. 5130, 5130 (1990).
65. Id.

66. Springfield News-Leader, July 17, 1990, at 1, col. 3 (Springfield Mo.).
67. Interview with Alfred C. Sikes, Chairman of the Federal Communications

Commission, COMMUNICATIONS

LAWYER,

Winter 1991, 1, 23.

68. Id.

69. 47 C.F.R. § 64.56(a) (1988).
70. In re Application of General Tel. Co., 3 F.C.C. Rec. 2317, 2317 (1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/5
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most of the cable system, its design, construction, and ownership necessitated
GTE leasing the system to Apollo'
The leaseback arrangement initially
was approved on "demonstrably could not exist" grounds. 72 After full FCC
review of the arrangement, it was concluded that there was "good cause" for
the GTE-Apollo affiliation.73 Cerritos represents the first grant of a "good
cause" waiver. According to one commentator, "[t]he decision may be the
harbinger of increased telephone company ownership of cable systems." 74
2. The Federal Judiciary
The federal judiciary has been unwilling to overturn or limit the crossownership restrictions. Concurring with the FCC, the judiciary appears to
consider Congress the proper body to resolve the cross-ownership dilemma.
Judge Harold Greene's decisions on the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ)
ban signify the most important judicial developments. The MFJ refers to the
consent decree entered, pursuant to federal antitrust laws, in the AT&T
antitrust litigation; it prohibits AT&T and former Bell Operating Companies
(BOCs) from providing "interexchange telecommunication services or
information services." 75 The cross-ownership includes the operation of cable
television systems.' Unless Judge Greene removes the ban on the generation of information services, congressional action is required before AT&T
and BOCs can operate cable television systems.
The Justice Department in 1987 recommended rescinding the MFJ
prohibition on the provision of information services. The Justice Department
considered the FCC structural and non-structural safeguards sufficient
protection against pre-divestiture abuses. 7 Judge Greene, however, rejected
the arguments of the Justice Department and the BOCs, and accepted the

71. Id. Such an arrangement is termed a "leaseback." GTE originally sought
section 214 authorization from the FCC for the leaseback cable system. Id.
72. Id. at 2323.
73. In re Application of General Tel. Co., 4 F.C.C. Rec. 5693, 5693 (1989). The
FCC limited the "good cause" waiver to five years and required that GTE contract with
another entity to provide the video programming. Id.
74. MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 31, at 902.
75. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 195 (D.D.C.
1982) [hereinafter AT&TJ, aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983).
76. Information service is defined as "the offering of a capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing or making available
information, which may be conveyed via telecommunications." Id. at 229.
77. United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 673 F. Supp. 525,528 (D.D.C. 1987)
(citation omitted), rev'd and remanded, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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views of the cable and newspaper companies.78 Judge Greene found that the
cable operators were still dependent on the BOCs for attaching their cables to
poles owned by the telcos and sharing conduit space. 79 The court felt that
the BOCs had the same incentive and ability to engage in anti-competitive
conduct as they did when the decree was entered in 1982.80 Judge Green
also regarded the FCC regulatory safeguards inadequate to prevent monopolistic abuses. 1
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed and remanded
Judge Greene's holding.8 2 The court found that Judge Greene, in reviewing
the restrictions on the provision of information services, should not have
applied the "substantial possibility of impeding competition" standard.
Instead, he should have used the more flexible "public interest" standard.83
Upon remand from the court of appeals, Judge Green reluctantly ruled
that the Bell Operating Companies may provide electronic information
services.' However the carefully drafted ruling had no effect on the MFJ

78. Id. at 567.
79. Id. at 564.
80. Id. at 565. Types of anti-competitive behavior by telcos the court still feared
included: manipulation of the quality of access lines; impairment of the speed, quality,
and efficiency of dedicated private lines used by competitors; the shifting of costs to
regulated business on a large scale (cross-subsidization); development of new
information services to take advantage of planned, but not yet publicly known, changes
in the interlying network; and use of the knowledge of the design, nature, geographic
coverage, and traffic patterns of competitive information service providers. Id. at 566.
81. Id. at 567-79.
82. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert.
denied sub. nom. MCI Communications Corp. v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 283 (1990),
remand,767 F. Supp. 308 (D.D.C. 1991), motion to vacate stay denied, No. 82-0192
(HHG) (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1991) (WESTLAW, Allfeds library).
83. Id. In reconsidering the information services ban under the "public interest"
standard, the court of appeals stated that the trial judge "should determine whether
removal of the information-services restriction as applied to the generation of

information would be anti-competitive under present market conditions. The court
should also bear in mind the flexibility of the public interest inquiry." Id. at 309
(footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
84. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308 (D.D.C. 1991).
According to Judge Green, "[t]he most probable consequences of such entry... will
be the elimination of the competition .. . and the concentration of the sources of
information of the American people in just a few dominant, collaborative conglomerates, with the captive local monopolies as their base." Id. at 326.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/5
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prohibition on cross-ownership. Judge Green stayed his order pending
appeal.8
Northwestern Indiana Telephone Co., Inc. v. FCC& represents another
telco-CATV battle before the FCC and the federal judiciary over the crossownership restrictions. The conflict initially involved CCI Cablevision (an
Indiana cable company), Northwest Indiana Cablevision, and Northwestern
Indiana Telephone Company, Incorporated (NITCO), a telco affiliated with
Northwest.'
The FCC determined that the affiliation between the two
companies violated FCC regulations.'
Besides leasing pole space to
Northwest, NITCO had constructed and maintained three cable television
systems for the cable company.8 9 The FCC's determination was upheld in
1989 by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. 90
The NITCO litigation produced a new standard for establishing a carrieruser relationship between a telco and CATV company. In two recent cases
(C & P and Ohio Bell)9' the FCC granted approval for telco-supported cable
systems because the relationship was within the carrier-user exception to the
cross-ownership rules. 92 NITCO and Northwest claimed their affiliation was
within the boundaries of the carrier-user relationship. 93 The FCC, however,
held that NITCO and Northwest did not satisfy the exception because NITCO

85. Id. at 333.

86. 872 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (denying review of CCI Cablevision v.
Northwestern Ind. Tel. Co., Inc., 3 F.C.C. Rec. 3096 (1988)) [hereinafter NITCO 11],
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990). The case was originally decided by the FCC in
Comark Cable Fund III v. Northwestern Ind. Tel. Co., Inc., 100 F.C.C. 2d 1244, reh'g
denied, 103 F.C.C. 2d 600 (1985), and remanded back to the FCC for clarification in
Northwestern Ind. Tel. Co., Inc. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter
NJTCO 1]).
87. Before the litigation concluded with the Supreme Court denying certiorari,
four major telecommunications players had intervened: the United States Telephone
Association, Bell Atlantic Telephone Company, National Cable Television Association,
Inc., and United States Cable Television Association, Inc. United States Cable of
Northern Indiana also intervened.
88. N1TCO 1, 824 F.2d at 1205-06.
89. Id.
90. NITCO II, 872 F.2d at 472.
91. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 57 Rad. Reg. 2d 1003 (1985) [hereinafter
C & P]; Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 1 F.C.C. Rec. 942, 942 (1986) [hereinafter Ohio Bell].
92. The carrier-user exception is derived from the language of note l(a) to
§ 63.54 of the cross-ownership regulations. Note 1(a), which defines "affiliate" in
sweeping terms, states that the term "affiliate" does not apply to the carrier-user

relationship. 47 C.F.R. § 63.54 n.l(a) (1988). The carrier-user exception traditionally
has been limited to the provision of channel distribution services.
93. NITCO 1, 824 F.2d at 1209.
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had not dealt with Northwest on common carrier terms. Unlike the telcos in
Ohio Bell and C & P, NITCO had not evinced a willingness to deal with other
cable companies on a common carrier basis. 4
The FCC's new, broader carrier-user definition encourages telco
involvement in cable television; Ohio Bell and C & P evidence the court's
approval of these relationships. Yet the NITCO litigation reveals that the FCC
will not tolerate telco/CATV relationships that hinder or prevent competition
with independent cable companies. There was no serious effort by NITCO to
separate itself from Northwest. Examples of such abusive affiliation were the
two companies sharing post office boxes, and NITCO leasing office space to
and guaranteeing loans for Northwest. NITCO's behavior clearly violated the
cross-ownership rules. It represents the type of telco behavior feared by the
cable television companies.
The second reason the NITCO case is significant is that it revealed the
judiciary's reluctance to involve itself in the cross-ownership conflict. Three
challenges raised by the defendants and the intervenors could have allowed the
court of appeals to settle the debate over the effectiveness, necessity and
constitutionality of the cross-ownership prohibitions. "Confronted with this
rather daunting fusillade," the court of appeals refused "to engage in the
invited widened battle."9 5 The court rejected the challenges on procedural
grounds. 96 By refusing to plunge into the cross-ownership feud, the court of
appeals adopted a posture of restraint. Except for requesting clarification of
the carrier-user relationship, the court respected the Commission's decisions.
The court's deference to the FCC demonstrates judicial respect for legislative
and agency resolution of domestic political issues such as telecommunication
policies.
B. CongressionalConsideration
Proposals concerning the cable television industry have flooded the floors
of the Senate and House of Representatives. Producing this flood have been
the FCC's reconsideration of the cross-ownership ban, the telephone industry's
lobbying, and the voters' hope for lower cable rates and improved services.
The proposals generally fall into two categories: reregulating the cable
industry, or interjecting other sources of competition into the cable market.

94. CCI Cablevision v. Northwestern Tel. Co., Inc., 3 F.C.C. Rec. 3096, 3097
(1988). For example, NITCO refused to offer to a competing cable company terms
similar to those granted Northwest. Id.
95. NITCO 11, 872 F.2d at 470.

96. Id. at 470-72.
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Senator Jack Danforth (R-Mo.) introduced the Cable Television
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 97 which restores the right of local
authorities to regulate cable television rates if there is an absence of effective
competition.98 The bill also prohibits exclusive programming arrangements
by CATV companies, and directs the FCC to establish new technical standards
for quality reception and customer service. 99 A similar measure was
approved by the House of Representatives last year, only to die on the Senate
floor.'4 Opposition to the 1990 measure was led by President Bush, who
threatened to veto the legislation."' The Bush Administration favors
competition, instead of regulation, to curb the cable industry's power."m
The Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, which
approved last year's package by a vote of eighteen to one, is currently
considering Danforth's legislation.103
The'death of Danforth's measure in 1990 kept the hope alive for telco
entry into cable television." 4 Senator Conrad Burns (R-Mont.) is expected
to reintroduce The Communications Competitiveness and Infrastructure
Modernization Act of 1990, which provides for telco entry into cable
television. 05 During the 101st Congress, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation reported, without objection, a modified and
weakened version of Senator Burns' bill. The Committee's approach required
only an FCC examination of telco entry into cable television, but approved of
telephone companies offering "video dial-tone" services."
Despite White

97. S. 12, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REc. 9 § 582 (1990). Senator Joseph
Lieberman (D-Conn.) and Representative Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) also have
introduced legislation. The Lieberman-Shays legislation "would give the FCC
authority to oversee rates in localities currently lacking cable competition."
Communications: Cable Regulation Measures, Top Agenda in 1991, BNA DAILY
REPORT FOR ExEcunvus, Jan 18, 1991 [hereinafter COMMUNIcATIONS].

98. Id.
99. Id.

100. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 29, 1990, at 8A, col. 4. For the House
version, see the Cable Television Consumer Protected and Competition Act of 1990,
H.R. 5267, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
101. Halonen, Telcos Seen as Beneficiaries of Cable Bill Death, ELECrRONIC
MEDIA, Oct. 29, 1990, at 34.
102. Id.

103. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 15, 1991, at 4A, col. 2.
104. Halonen, supra note 101, at 44-45.
105. S. 2800, Senator Bums' bill in the 101st Congress, included the following
requirements for telcos in order to safeguard the cable industry: separate subsidiaries;
mandated access for unaffiliated programmers; franchising limitations; and a
prohibition on the marketing and selling of video program services.
106. The "video dial-tone" concept received the recommendation of the National
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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House approval, 10 7 Senator Burns' legislation does not enjoy the widespread
03
support accompanying Senator Danforth's reregulation package.

IV. ANALYSIS: A RETURN TO REGULATION,
OR COMPETITION VIA TELCO ENTRY?

The judiciary and the FCC appear to be awaiting congressional action on
the cross-ownership issue. The FCC has been silent on the cross-ownership
issue since the 1988 recommendation. The judiciary's stance in the NITCO
and AT&T cases reveals that it shares the Commission's "wait-and-see"
approach. There is legal precedent supporting the judiciary and the FCC
formulating telecommunications policies."° Deference to Congress, however, is the proper posture toward cross-ownership between telephone and cable
companies. A range of factors must be weighed in determining whether the
prohibition against cross-ownership should continue. Congress, through its
elaborate committee structure, provides a forum in which all parties can be
heard. Congress is cognizant of the rise in cable television rates and
increasingly poor CATV service; it is also aware of the telco potential for
monopolistic behavior. The involvement of Congress in the debate over the
future of CATV makes agency and judicial consideration unnecessary. Of
course, Congress typically decides only broad policy. The Commission is
usually delegated the power to implement such policy, with the judiciary
refining the FCC's standards.
Judicial and FCC deference to the legislature merely delays the question
of what policy Congress will and should choose for telephone company

Telecommunications and Information Administration. Video ProgramDistributionand
Cable Television: CurrentPolicy,Issues and Recommendations, NTIA Report 88-233

(1988). The system, while barring telcos from controlling the content of the
programming they carry, would allow the telephone companies to transport the
programming of others. Id.
The FCC rejected the NTIA proposal because it believed that without the video
programming market, there would be insufficient financial incentives to induce telcos
to develop, invest in, and operate the facilities that could be used to provide video
entertainment programming and other services. 1988 Further Notice of Inquiry, supra
note 43, at 5887.
107. Press Release, Bums Introduces Legislation to Spur Competition and
Deployment of New Technology in Communications Industry, Sen. Conrad Bums
(June 28, 1990).
108. COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 97.
109. Examples of such FCC and judicial activism are the original implementation
of the cross-ownership regulations and the subsequent court approval of the rules, and
the antitrust litigation involving the break-up of AT&T. See text accompanying supra
note 75.
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involvement in cable television. To answer that question, the status of the
CATV industry must be considered to decide whether industry conditions
necessitate legislative and agency intervention. The current cable television
market serves as a backdrop for a critique of the two primary cable reform
movements: reregulation and telco entry into cable.
A.

The Current Cable Television Market

Prior to 1986, the cable industry was regulated by municipal authorities.
Effective December 29, 1986, the Cable Act prohibited municipalities from regulating basic cable rates if "effective competition" existed."'
Pursuant to authority granted by the Cable Act, the FCC determined that a
cable television system was subject to effective competition, and therefore
110

exempt from local rate regulation, if three or more broadcast television signals
2

were available to the entire geographical area of the cable community.1
As a result of the Cable Act and the Commission's subsequent adoption
of the definition of "effective competition," "basic service rates for all but a
few cable systems are generally unregulated."" 3 According to a General
Accounting Office survey, monthly rates rose more than fifty percent since
1986.114 Furthermore, the average number if channels has decreased by
one. 5 There has also been a "rising frustration over the poor quality of
technical and customer service."" 6
The lack of regulatory limits on the rates charged by CATV operators has
obviously contributed to the monopoly in the cable television industry. The
dearth of competition from other entertainment sources has also boosted the

110. The Effective Competition Standard,supra note 59, at 2.
111. 47 U.S.C. §§ 543(b)(1), (c) (1988).
112. See Report and Order, MM Docket No. 84-1296, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637-01
(1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC,
823 F.2d 1554 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,485 U.S. 959 (1988). The FCC, because
of changed circumstances in the video marketplace is considering modification of
warranted review of the "three signal" standard. See The Effective Competition
Standard,supra note 59, at 215.
113. In re Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission's Policies Relating
to the Provision of Cable Television Service (Notice of Inquiry), MM Docket No. 89600, 55 Fed. Reg. 32631-01, at 9 (Dec. 12, 1989) [hereinafter Inquiry on Reregulating
the Cable Industry]. The National League of Cities (NLC) states that rate regulation
is prohibited in more than ninety-nine percent of its direct member cities. Id.
114. Cable Fees Up 50 Pct. Since 1986, St. Louis Post Dispatch, July 19, 1991
p. 5B. The General Accounting Office surveyed 1,505 cable television systems. There
are about 9,600 cable systems in the nations. Id.
115. Competition and Rate DeregulationReport, supra note 60, at 4968.
116. Id.
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cable monopoly. Cable systems encounter competition from such sources as
broadcast television and video cassette recorders (VCRs). But this competiindirect, and thus is not sufficient to limit cable's overall market
tion is only
7
power.1
An unregulated monopoly usually results in high consumer rates and
poor consumer service. Both conditions exist in the current cable television
market. Less visible signs of the cable monopoly are the slow pace in
introducing innovative new services, such as fiber optics and HDTV, and the
forgone opportunity of improving the nation's telecommunications infrastructure." 8 Without competition, cable operators have little or no incentive to
invest in expensive new technology or to provide new services.
B. The Proposals to End Cable's Monopoly
The proposals for CATV reform generally fall into two categories: (1)

reregulating the cable industry, particularly cable rates, or (2) allowing
telephone company entry into the CATV industry, so as to introduce direct
competition into cable television markets. An effective proposal will cure not
only the visible symptoms of the cable monopoly (such as the skyrocketing
rates and poor customer service), but also the less visible woes, such as the
slow pace in introducing innovative new services and the failure to improve
the nation's telecommunications infrastructure.
1. Reimposing Regulation
Cable television was a regulated industry prior to the passage of the 1984
Cable Act. The aim of the Cable Act was to foster competition by eliminating
regulation. Because the Cable Act achieved a monopolistic, instead of
competitive, marketplace, many are urging a return of regulation.
There are two primary types of regulation: structural and economic.
Structural regulation addresses issues such as broadcast signal carriage,
channel positioning, third-party access, vertical integration, and concentration
of control in the cable industry. The critics of the CATV industry seem to
agree that structural regulation is needed to cure both the visible and less
visible symptoms of the cable television monopoly. Congressman Rick
Boucher (D-Va.), a critic of most forms of reregulation, concedes that any

117. Id. at 4994-5003.
118. Representative R. Boucher, Cable Competition v. Cable Regulation, White
Paper On Telecommunications Policy 5 (Feb. 22, 1990) (unpublished report)
[hereinafter Boucher White Paper]. Boucher prepared the report for the Senate Energy
and Commerce Committee.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/5
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cable industry reform must include structural reregulation." 9 The reregulation legislation introduced by Senator Jack Danforth includes "must carry"
rules. These rules limit the discretion of cable television systems to shift
channel positions. They also bar national and regional cable programmers
from discriminating against distributors in the price, terms, conditions or
availability of their programming. 12° The almost universal support for
structural regulation indicates that provisions similar to those in the Danforth
measure will be enacted.
Economic regulation addresses only issues such as the rates cable
companies can charge or the profits they can earn. Economic regulation can
be reimposed under three methods: (1) traditional municipal regulation; (2)
rate-of-return regulation; and (3) price regulation. While each approach would
restrict the market power of cable operators, the implementation of each
presents significant problems.
The traditional municipal regulation, which existed prior to 1984, would
invite many of the same problems encountered previously.'21 Foremost
among these problems is the absence of adequate standards for setting rates.
Negotiation of the rates in a heavily-politicized environment worsens this ratesetting problem.' 22 Municipal regulation is also flawed because it regulates
only the basic rates, leaving the cable companies free to charge whatever they
wish for other services. 12 Finally, municipal officials often lack the
specialized experience necessary to successfully administer a regulatory
scheme.124

Rate-of-return regulation limits the profits that a firm can earn to a
reasonable level. Establishing the appropriate initial-rate base requires
determination of the true value of a cable television system. Calculating the
market value of a cable system proves difficult because of the inflated value
of many systems. Rate-of-return regulation allows a firm to recover its
expenses. As a result, there is little incentive to cut costs.125
The third option for economic regulation is to control cable rates.
Because cable rates are currently unregulated, the appropriate starting point for
rates is difficult to establish.2
Various sources report that some cable

119. Id. at 9.
120. S. 1880, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 28 (1989).
121. Boucher White Paper, supra note 118, at 10.

122. Id. at 11.
123. Id.

124. Id.
125. Id. at 12-13.
126. Id. at 13-14.
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operators, anticipating rate-cap regulation based on current rates, raised their
rates to increase their locked-in returns. 127
Setting aside problems in implementation, economic regulation is
inadequate because it ignores many of the difficulties resulting from cable's
unconstrained market power. Reregulation does not encourage improvement
in customer service. Firms have little incentive to improve such service
because market share is unimportant." Economic regulation also neglects
the introduction of new services, as significant expenditures are made
unattractive by fixed rates or fixed profits.
Senator Danforth's Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of
1991,19 proposes economic reregulation as a solution to the cable industry's
woes. The legislation reimposes traditional municipal regulation unless the
cable system faces competition from another multichannel provider. 3
Although Danforth's proposal produces the immediate and pleasurable result
of lower cable rates, it does not consider the broader goals of cable television
reform.
2. The Alternative to Reregulation: Telco Entry
The alternative to reregulation is direct competition. Both the Bush
Administration and the FCC favor competition as the solution to the cable
industry's woes. The Communications Competitiveness and Infrastructure
Modernization Act is expected to be reintroduced in 1991 by Senator Conrad
Burns. This legislation seeks to provide direct competition to the cable
operators by permitting telephone companies to provide video program3
ming.1 1
a. The Need for Competition
Competition provides strong incentives for improving products, lowering
rates, and introducing innovative services. In a purely competitive environment, resources are maximized and costs are minimized. As a result,
consumers benefit by efficient management, competitive prices, and greater
variety.
Resources apparently are not being maximized in the cable industry. The
Consumer Federation of America reports consumers are paying as much as six

127. Id. at 14. See Reregulation Fears Could Spur More Cable Rate Increases,
COMM. DAILY, at 8 (Oct. 5, 1989).
128. Boucher White Paper, supra note 118, at 15.
129. S. 12, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1990); see 137 CONG. REC. 9 § 582 (1990).

130. Id.
131. For Senator Bums' 1990 Package, see S. 2800, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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billion dollars for the cable industry's inefficiency. 132 Consumers historical-

ly have benefitted from competition in various telecommunications markets,
including satellite video systems and long distance telephone services.133 In
1972 the FCC determined that any qualified applicant could operate a
domestic satellite system. Prior to that determination, FCC regulation and a
lack of innovation limited competition in the satellite systems industry."3
But since the 1972 "open skies decision," satellite systems have become
smaller and less expensive. Broadcasters, cable operators and private dish
owners have options not previously available. The introduction of competition
in the mid-1970s to the long distance telephone market similarly accelerated
the adoption of new technology. Firms are now vying to provide customers
with the least expensive, highest quality voice and data transmission. 35
With the exception of a few cable overbuilds, the cable industry does not
Cable's current
face direct competition in the distribution of services. 136curn
satellite
industry, and
wireless
cable,
the
home
rivals-broadcast television,
VCRs-only provide indirect competition.
Broadcast television offers only limited competition. In almost all
markets, the local broadcast stations (over-the-air channels) are outnumbered
by the average thirty-six channels available on local cable systems." 7 The
ability of broadcasters to compete directly with cable television is further
limited by FCC rules and the 1984 Cable Act. Both of these prohibit local
broadcasters from owning cable systems and broadcast stations in the same
market. 38 Technical and regulatory limitations prevent wireless cable from
offering a practical alternative to cable television. 139 There are currently
only forty-five wireless cable systems serving 350,000 subscribers nationwide. 141 In contrast, approximately ninety percent of American homes are
cable-ready.'

132. Boucher White Paper, supra note 118, at 16 (citing testimony of Gene
Kimmelman and Mark Cooper, Consumer Federation of America, on Competitive
Issues in the Cable Television Industry, before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust,

Monopolies and Business Rights).
133. Id. at 17.
134. Id. (citation omitted).
135. Id. at 18 n.30 (quoting Tucker, Spinning Webs of Fiber Optics Across the
U.S., Washington Post, Mar. 31, 1987, at 1).

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See text accompanying supra note 49.
Boucher White Paper, supra note 118, at 20.
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 533(a) (1988).
Boucher White Paper, supra note 118, at 21.
Id. at 22.

141. Competition and Rate DeregulationReport, supra note 60, at 4966.
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The home satellite industry, hindered by federal regulations, is in its
initial stages; only 2.8 million Americans own satellite dishes. 42 Recent
technological breakthroughs, such as the development of a 12-inch by 18-inch
satellite dish that perches on a window ledge,'43 may allow satellite dishes
to directly compete with cable systems. But such developments are not yet
widely available, and decisions concerning CATV should be based on the
current marketplace. Despite at least one VCR in sixty-three percent of all
homes containing televisions, VCRs are only a limited alternative to cable;
1 44
neither pay television nor basic services are available on videotape.
The dramatic increases in cable television rates reveal that this diverse
group of program distribution services only provide indirect competition.
Reregulation cures merely short-term woes, and current market forces are
ineffective at curbing the other elements of the cable monopoly. Direct
competition remains the only solution for lower rates and improved technology.
b. Telco Competition with Cable is Most Promising
Unlike cable television's indirect competitors, telephone companies and
cable systems operate in the same markets. The fiber optics systems deployed
by the telcos to transmit video programming' 45 would not be encumbered
by any radio reception problems interfering with over-the-air video transmissions."4 Because telephone companies can deliver the same product as the
cable operators, can participate in a broad market, and can avoid reception
interference problems, telcos can directly compete with CATV systems.
The potential for new technologies and new services makes telco entry
even more appealing. Programming would provide telephone companies with
the additional revenues needed for expensive new technologies. The FCC
estimates that fiber optics installation will cost over $100 billion.147 Without
the promise of a second stream of revenue, telcos have difficulty justifying
such a capital outlay.'4
There are risks associated with telephone company entry into cable
television. The most frightening possibility is the cross-subsidization of cable

142. Boucher White Paper, supra note 118, at 23 (citing Satellite Broadcasting
and Communications Association of America, Satellite TV: Factsat a Glance (Jan.
1990)).
143. Dishing Out The Programs,TIME, Mar. 5, 1990, at 45.
144. Boucher White Paper, supra note 118, at 23-24.
145. Id. at 24.
146. Id. at 24-25.
147. Pepper, supra note 58, at 7-9.
148. See Sodolski, supra note 18, at 22.
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programming by telephone revenues."' Independent cable operators are
particularly vulnerable to cross-subsidizing telephone companies. Other risks
of telco entry include a lack of access to telco systems and traditional telco
anti-competitive behavior. The ultimate danger posed by telco-supplied video
is the powerful and wealthy telephone companies eventually controlling most
means of video communication.
Although such fears are legitimate, implementation of the appropriate
safeguards can minimize the possibility of these nightmares becoming reality.
The structural and non-structural safeguards recommended by the FCC are the
primary protection.150 Requiring the telcos to provide detailed information
regarding costs and charges can prevent cross-subsidization. Non-affiliated
program providers can be assured of access to the integrated network through
a "video gateway" requirementI5l The separate subsidiary requirement can
prevent telco strength from overwhelming the independent cable operators. 52

V. CONCLUSION

Implementation of the cross-ownership rules in the early 1970's by the
FCC and congressional approval of the rules in 1984 were proper responses
to the developing cable television industry. Without bans on telco entry into
cable television, it is doubtful there would be as many strong independent
cable systems as there are today. But because the cross-ownership restrictions
provided the cable market with time to establish a solid foundation, and the
1984 Cable Act relieved cable companies of local government regulation, the
cable market in the late 1980's evolved into a monopoly, with increasing rates
and poor customer service. The most frightening cable monopoly woe is the
slow pace maintained by the telephone and cable companies of introducing
new technologies.
The cable television monopoly prompted Congress to debate whether
reregulation or telco entry is the appropriate measure of reform. Reregulation
seems to be the approach favored by the legislators. Reimposing economic
regulation, however, can only accomplish the goal of decreasing cable
television rates. The introduction of competition via telco entry can, besides
decreasing cable rates and enhancing customer service, improve the nation's
telecommunications infrastructure.

149. According to Senator Danforth's office, cross-subsidization is the primary
reason his legislation does not provide for telco entry into cable. Telephone interview
with Jeanna Kenney, assistant to Senator Jack Danforth (Mar. 4, 1990).
150. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
151. Boucher White Paper, supra note 118, at 28-29.
152. Id. at 29.
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Congress probably will be the forum in which the cross-ownership feud
is settled. The FCC and the judiciary are deferring to the judgment of the
elected leaders on this delicate issue. It is questionable whether Congress will
decide the fate of telco-supplied cable television in the current session.
Congress may hesitate to take any action concerning the cable industry since
the comprehensive Cable Act was passed only in 1984. Laws affecting
telecommunications quickly become out-dated, however, as telecommunications technology changes rapidly.
Congress is urged to resolve quickly the cross-ownership debate. Cable
rates, customer and technical services, and the introduction of new technology
suffer until the debate is concluded. A nation's telecommunications
infrastructure is critical to competing in the global marketplace, as the
statements of William L. Weiss, presented at the beginning of this Comment,
reveal. Japan is deploying a "family computer" that will educate Japanese
children.153 France's Minitel system enables French citizens to access
electronically, at millions of terminals nationwide, directory services and to
obtain information.
Japan and France have recognized the value of
telecommunications, and both are accomplishing tasks beyond the current
capacity of the United States. Cross-ownership of cable television systems by
telephone companies can help America achieve a stronger telecommunications
system, and consumers and the nation should not be denied such a benefit.
PHILIP J. BOECKMAN

153. Id. at 4 (quoting Alfred C. Sikes, Chairman, Federal Communications
Commission).
154. Id. at 5.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/5
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